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MNC Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
Part I. Introduction.
Over the past quarter century the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) has emerged from the
backwater of federal jurisprudence to become the pre-eminent weapon foreign nationals wield in
asserting human rights claims.1 Not surprisingly, many such plaintiffs have targeted multinational corporations (MNCs).2 The reasons for this address both the substantive issues of
human rights claims and matters of procedural practicality. As to the former, they include the
following: MNCs have the deep pockets to compensate alleged injuries; their name brands
provide the publicity necessary to attract international attention;3 and their overseas operations
are generally the locus and the raison d’être for the alleged wrongs.

1

Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 1350. Originally adopted as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789, the act now provides: “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” The ATCA went largely unused for about 190 years until Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), when the Second Circuit held that the ATCA supported a
private cause of action for official acts of torture. Filartiga effectively threw open the doors to
the federal courts for foreign human rights litigants.
2
See Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating International
Law, 4 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, n.1 (1999) (defining MNC as a “private
commercial enterprise that owns or controls production or service facilities outside the country in
which it is based,” and encompasses commercial activity conducted by a foreign subsidiary,
foreign branch and joint ventures). See also PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND THE LAW 12-14 (1995); D. Kokkini-Iatridou & P.J.I.M. de Waart, Foreign Investments in
Developing Countries – Legal Personality of Multinationals in International Law, 14 NETH. Y.B.
INT’L L. 87 (1983), cited in id.
3
See Malin Käll, Oil-Exploration in Nigeria: Procedures Addressing Human Rights Abuses, in 1
EXPANDING THE HORIZONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 193, 217 (Ineta Ziemele ed., 2005)
(“Victims from the region [in Nigeria] and engaged NGOs were not satisfied with seeking
redress in national courts, but also tried to gain international attention. Suits were filed in U.S.
courts, communications were sent to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
and contacts established with the international community. . . . The plaintiffs [in Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.] alleged that corporate defendants’ conduct had violated international and
common law and that the violations were actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act.”);
Earthrights International, Press Release: Historic Advance for International Human Rights:
Unocal to Compensate Burmese Villagers,
http://www.earthrights.org/news/press_unocal_settle.shtml (last visited October 17, 2005) (“John
Doe IX, a plaintiff who had done back-breaking forced labor in the mid 1990’s, said, ‘I don’t
2
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The procedural reasons, while perhaps not as obvious, are equally compelling. First,
many victims of violence done by their own government are unlikely or incapable of seeking
justice in their home countries. Second, there is often a “jurisdictional lacuna”, a gap, in
international law where the law of the MNC’s home country cannot reach and the law of the host
country does not wish to disturb.4 The “MNC has transcended national legal systems and
ignored the feeble international system to make the imposition of human rights norms nearly
impossible.”5 The ATCA succeeds in filling this gap by providing both federal jurisdiction and a
cause of action for violations of international customary law. As far as providing a forum for
validating human rights claims against private actors,6 the ATCA is the only game in town.
Third, certain defenses available to ATCA defendants (e.g., personal jurisdiction, forum non
conveniens, the act of state doctrine,7 the doctrine of international comity,8 the political question

care about the money. Most of all I wanted the world to know what Unocal did. Now you
know.’”).
4
Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating International
Law, 4 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 86 (1999).
5
Daniel Aguirre, Multinational Corporations and the Realisation of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 35 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 53, 57 (2004). See also Deltev F. Vagts, The
Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739
(1969).
6
As will be explained below in the Kadic case, the ATCA bucks the general rule that
international law only applies to state actors.
7
See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (“[T]he courts of one country will not sit
in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.”). See also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (“The act of state doctrine in its
traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the
public acts of a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.”); W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990) (finding that
application of the doctrine requires a balancing of interests and that it should not be invoked if
the policies underlying the doctrine do not justify its application); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239
F.3d 440, 451 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying the court’s own gloss on the doctrine in finding error in
the district court’s invocation of the doctrine to abstain from hearing a claim brought under the
ATCA); see also Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 694 (1976)
(allocating the burden of proof to defendants to justify application of the doctrine). But see
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t would be a rare case in which the act of
3
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doctrine,9 foreign sovereign immunity,10 and head-of-state immunity11) often result in the foreign
government party being dismissed from the case leaving the MNC as the only available
defendant.12 Consequently, liability flows past the foreign government and the MNC is left
holding the proverbial bag.

state doctrine precluded suit under section 1350.”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d
Cir. 1980) (doubting whether the actions of a state official in violation of its country’s
constitution and laws, and unratified by its government, could be characterized as an act of state,
in an ATCA suit alleging torture); The Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (“[N]o
court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make
a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in
which a claim . . . is asserted . . . based upon . . . a confiscation or other taking after January 1,
1959 . . . [unless] the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required
in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States . . . .”). See generally
Elliott E. Cheatham & Harold G. Maier, Private International Law and Its Sources, 22 VAND. L.
REV. 27, 88 (1968) (relating the act of state doctrine to the principle of sovereign immunity).
8
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2782 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
9
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.21
(2004) (recognizing the serious weight federal courts should give to the Executive Branch’s view
of the case’s impact on foreign policy); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995)
(applying the Baker factors to hold that action brought under the ATCA and TVPA was not
precluded by the political question doctrine). But see Mujica v. Occidental, 381 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1191-96 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (barring action on grounds of the political question doctrine);
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (barring action on grounds of political
question doctrine). See generally Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
Administrations Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169 (2004).
10
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq. (2005);
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (holding that any
grant of jurisdiction under the ATCA for actions against foreign sovereign nations was
superseded or preempted by the limiting provisions of the FSIA); H.R. REP. NO. 102-367(I), at 5
(2005) (stating that the TVPA is subject to the restrictions of the FSIA).
11
See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F.Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45
(2d Cir. 1988) (passage of FSIA leaves scope of head-of-state immunity uncertain).
12
See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in pt., rev’d in pt., 395
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed,
403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the military government of Burma and its state-owned
company, which was engaged in a joint-venture with the MNC defendants for the construction of
a gas pipeline, were entitled to sovereign immunity pursuant to the FSIA because the claims of
civil rights abuses did not fall within the commercial activity exception and dismissing them as
defendants because they were not necessary and indispensable parties within the meaning of
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
4
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That is not to suggest that MNCs are ignorant of the social and political context in which
their foreign companies operate, especially in the extraction and agricultural industries. Yet,
MNCs’ foreign operations are often encouraged if not explicitly approved by the United States’
legislative and executive branches. This puts an interesting counter-majoritarian twist on the
way federal courts have sought to assign civil liability to MNCs through the ATCA.
This paper seeks to elucidate the fundamental sources of ATCA jurisprudence that have
modernized the act into the weapon it has become for foreign human rights plaintiffs. It also
attempts to describe some of the forms of liability asserted against MNCs, paying special
attention to the competing forms of aiding & abetting liability as conceptualized in the Unocal
case. For a broader history and description of ATCA case law, there exists a wealth of books
and articles on the subject.13 Part II of this paper will provide a brief and concise review of the
three cases every ATCA corporate defendant should know: Filartiga, Kadic and Sosa.14 These
cases lay the groundwork for human rights litigation against MNCs under the ATCA’s modern
epoch. Part III will address the state-action requirement, for both the ATCA and the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).15 It is the initial hurdle for every litigant and there are
various methods for either overcoming it or simply avoiding it entirely depending on which tort-

13

See generally LINDA A. WILLET, MICHELE S. SUGGS & M. ALEXIS PENNOTTI, THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (2003); GARY CLYDE
HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING THE MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE OF 1789 (2003); Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1350), Providing for Federal Jurisdiction Over Alien’s Action
for Tort Committed in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of the United States, 116 A.L.R.
FED. 387 (2005); James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 Note, 199 A.L.R. FED. 389 (2005); Tracy
Bishop Holton, Cause of Action to Recover Civil Damages Pursuant to the Law of Nations
and/or Customary International Law, 21 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 327 (2005).
14
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
15
28 U.S.C. §1350 note § 2(a) (2005).
5
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claim is asserted. Finally, Part IV will address the methods by which MNCs are held liable as
aiders and abettors of foreign government tortfeasors.
Part II. Laying the Groundwork.
Filartiga, Kadic and Sosa provide the background necessary to appreciate where MNCs
stand in the modern epoch of the ATCA. Each case marked a significant development in the
jurisprudence of MNC liability under the ATCA. Filartiga held that an act of official torture
constituted a violation of the law of nations and that individuals committing such acts abroad
under State authority could be held liable in the United States under the ATCA.16 Kadic held,
perhaps more remarkably, that private actors may be held liable under the ATCA for violating
the law of nations even when not acting under the auspices of a State. Finally, Sosa, for the most
part maintained the status quo for ATCA jurisprudence, but sent a stern admonition to the lower
courts not to get too relaxed in their determinations of what constitutes a violation of the law of
nations.
A. Filartiga v. Peña-Irala
Filartiga has been heralded as the case that kicked open the doors of the federal
courthouse for international human rights claims.17 Prior to Filartiga, the ATCA was a “legal
Lohengrin,”18 unfamiliar and rarely invoked.19 Yet since, the Act has attained the peak of

16

See generally Beth Stevens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1
(2002).
17
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (“[W]e believe it is sufficient here to construe the [ATCA], not as
granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts for adjudication of the
rights already recognized by international law.”).
18
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (“no one seems to know whence it
came”).
19
See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887; Id. at 888 n.21 (citing Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857 (D. Md.
1961) (finding ATCA jurisdiction over child custody suit between aliens where falsified passport
supplied the international law violation); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 Fed. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795)
6
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notoriety, equally reviled as it is praised, and used with increasing frequency by human rights
plaintiffs for an ever-expanding list of international law violations. Viewed narrowly, the
Filartiga case recognized official torture as a violation of the law nations such that district courts
would have jurisdiction under the ATCA. Viewed broadly, as most human rights plaintiffs and
activists prefer to, Filartiga provided that a State’s treatment of its own citizens could create a
human rights oriented private cause of action under the ATCA; it meant that an alien could sue a
private individual for an international law violation as long as the act was perpetrated under the
color of official authority. Most significantly, perhaps, Filartiga freed the ATCA from its
eighteenth century moorings by holding that “the constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Statute is
the law of nations, which has always been part of the federal common law”20 and “courts must
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the
nations today.”21
Circuit Judge Irving Kaufman wrote the opinion, reversing the district court’s dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He held “that deliberate torture perpetrated under color of
official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights.”22
The plaintiffs’ allegations, though startling, are not unfamiliar. Dr. Filartiga and his daughter,
citizens of Paraguay residing in the U.S., alleged that Pena-Irala, who was at the time Inspector
General of the Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, kidnapped, tortured and murdered the doctor’s son

(finding ATCA jurisdiction over suit to determine title to slaves found on board an enemy vessel
taken on the high seas)).
20
Filartiga, 630 F. 2d at 885.
21
Id. at 881. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F. 2d 421, 425 (2d.
Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (“Evolving standards of international
law govern who is within the [ATCA’s] jurisdictional grant.”).
22
Id. at 878.
7
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in retaliation for the father’s political activities.23 Subsequently, Dr. Filartiga commenced a
criminal action in Paraguay against Pena and the police. Unfortunately, Filartiga’s lawyer was
arrested by Pena, shackled to a wall at police headquarters, threatened with death and eventually
disbarred. Forum non conveniens, indeed. Plaintiffs sought $10 million in compensatory and
punitive damages for wrongful death and torture and claimed jurisdiction under the ATCA.
The primary issue of subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA required it to be
determined whether the acts alleged by the Filartigas violated the law of nations.24 Kaufman
analyzed the issue first, as to the rules applied in ascertaining international law and second, as to
the evidence that official torture was indeed prohibited by the law of nations.
In ascertaining the sources of international law, Kaufman looked first to the Supreme
Court. In United States v. Smith, the Court stated: “the law of nations ‘may be ascertained by
consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and
practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.’”25 The Smith
Court found in the writings of Lord Bacon, Grotius and Bochard a consensus rendering piracy
“‘sufficiently and constitutionally defined.’”26 In The Paquete Habana, the Court had held that
the works of jurists and commentators might be used as evidence of the “‘customs and usages of
civilized nations’” “‘where there is no treaty, controlling executive or legislative act, or judicial
decision.’”27 Judge Kaufman cited the Statute of the International Court of Justice as reaffirming

23

Id.
The plaintiffs did not allege the conduct arose under a treaty of the United States. Id. at 880.
25
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820)).
26
Id. (quoting Smith, 18 U.S. at 162).
27
Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), cited with approval in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766-67 (2004)).
24

8
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this standard.28 Furthermore, Habana announced the requirement that what was formerly only a
standard may ripen into a binding rule of international law by ‘the general assent of civilized
nations,’”29 and therefore “courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it
has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”30
Judge Kaufman proceeded to explicate the various sources in which evidence of the
international prohibition against torture could be found, namely: international conventions,
writings of commentators, national law and U.S. policy. He began with the United Nations
Charter for the principle that “a state’s treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international
concern.”31 The Charter stated that the UN “‘shall promote universal . . . observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms’” with its members pledging to take “‘joint and separate
action’” in order to achieve this purpose.32 Evidence of the right to be free from torture as being
one such “human right and fundamental freedom” was found in two important U.N. declarations.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated, “‘no one shall be subjected to torture.’”33
The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture prohibited any
state from permitting torture. It expressly defined torture as “‘any act by which severe pain and
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public

28

Id. at 881 (citing Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055 (1945) (in deciding in accordance with international law, the ICJ shall apply international
conventions, international custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and
judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified publicists)).
29
Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694).
30
Id. See also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 198 (1796) (distinguishing between “ancient” and
“modern” law of nations).
31
Id. at 881.
32
Id. (quoting U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56, 59 Stat. 1033 (1945)).
33
Id. at 882 (quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 5, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)). In a subsequent resolution,
the General Assembly “declared that the Charter precepts embodied in this Universal Declaration
‘constitute basic principles of international law.’” Id.
9
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official on a person for such purposes as’” obtaining information or a confession, as punishment,
or as intimidation.34 Further evidence was found in several other international treaties. The
American Convention on Human Rights stated, ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.’”35 This principle was echoed in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.36
Kaufman found relevant the writings of several commentators as well. For instance, one
such commentator cited by the court found that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “‘no
longer fits into the dichotomy of binding treaty against non-binding pronouncement, but is rather
an authoritative statement of the international community.’”37 Other commentators concluded
the declaration has become a part of “binding, customary international law.”38 Yet another
pointed to states themselves as evidence of an international law, saying the “‘best evidence for
the existence of international law is that every actual State recognizes that it does exist and that it
is itself under an obligation to observe it.’”39
Finally, Judge Kaufman found evidence of the international prohibition against torture in
national laws and U.S. policy. He cited a survey that stated that torture was implicitly or

34

Id. at 883 (quoting Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, at 30, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. DOC A/1034 (1975)).
35
Id. (quoting Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 5,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123).
36
Id. at 884.
37
Id. at 883 (quoting E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 70
(1964)).
38
Id. (citing Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy, 19
HARV. INT’L L.J. 813, 816-17 (1978); Waldlock, Human Rights in Contemporary International
Law and the Significance of the European Convention, INT’L & COMP. L.Q., SUPP. PUBL. NO. 11,
1965, at 15).
39
Id. at 884 n.15 (quoting J. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (Oxford
1944)).
10
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expressly prohibited by the constitutions of over fifty-five nations, including the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article Forty-Five of the Constitution of Paraguay.40
Furthermore, U.S. foreign policy expressly promoted the principle that “international law confers
fundamental rights upon all people vis-à-vis their own governments.”41 Sections of title twentytwo of the United States Code declared that “‘no security assistance may be provided to any
country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights’” and that “‘the individual liberties, economic
prosperity, and security of the people of the United States are best sustained and enhanced in a
community of nations which respect individual civil and economic rights and freedoms.’”42
Judge Kaufman ultimately concluded, based upon his examination of the previously
described sources from which customary international law is derived, that official torture is
prohibited by the law of nations. Consequently, the ATCA may provide federal jurisdiction for a
private cause of action alleging official torture.
In the remainder of the opinion, Judge Kaufman contended with several subsidiary
arguments advanced by the respondent, including whether federal jurisdiction under the ATCA
was consistent with Article III of the Constitution. Kaufman ultimately found that the Act was
constitutional in its grant of federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court had held that a case arises
under the laws of the United States for Article III purposes if it is either grounded upon federal
statute or United States common law.43 After a review of the history of the Constitution and its
relationship with international law at the time of its framing, Kaufman concluded that the law

40

Id.
Id. at 885.
42
Id. at 885 n.17 (quoting 22 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(2), 2151(a)).
43
Id. at 886 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972)).
41

11
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nations became part of the common law of the United States upon the adoption of the
Constitution. Thus, the ATCA was authorized by Article III.
In arriving at that decision, Kaufman acknowledged as undisputed the fact that domestic
state courts could hear claims for torts committed overseas, as long as the act was unlawful
where performed. The parties agreed that here, where personal jurisdiction has been obtained,
“the acts alleged would violate Paraguayan law, and the policies of the forum are consistent with
the foreign law, state court jurisdiction would be proper.”44 In describing what federal policies
were consistent with foreign law, Judge Kaufman stated, “the conduct alleged here [i.e. police
torture in violation of national law] would be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . if performed
by a government official.”45 This statement provided an early indication of what standard the
courts would employ in determining whether the alleged international law violation occurred
under the color of official authority, thus satisfying the general state-action requirement under
international law. However, there is something counter-intuitive in grafting this standard onto
the ATCA. Under domestic tort actions, section 1983 is used to attribute the conduct of an
individual to the state, yet under the ATCA, section 1983 is used to attribute the conduct of the
state, i.e. a state actor, to a private individual, where as here, Filartiga is seeking compensation
from Pena-Irala, not Asuncion, Paraguay.
B. Kadic v. Karadzic & The Genocide Exception
In reversing the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
Second Circuit in Kadic did something that Scalia would later call “truly remarkable”.46 It
disregarded Congress’ explicit instructions and held that a private cause of action for genocide

44

Id.
Id. at 885 n.18.
46
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2775 (Scalia, J., concurring).
45

12
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and war crimes existed under the ATCA, and that such claims may apply against a private actor
in his private capacity without a showing of State action. I shall refer to this loophole in
international law, a law that generally applies only to State actors, 47 as the “genocide exception.”
In so holding, the Kadic court was expanding upon Judge Edwards’s observation in Tel-Oren
that there are a “handful of crimes” including piracy and slave trading, “to which the law of
nations attributes individual liability,” such that state action is not required.48 Furthermore, the
Kadic court applied a “color of law” standard in order to hold that the private actor defendant
may be found liable under the ATCA and the TVPA in his capacity as a state actor for additional
international law violations that did require official action.
In Kadic, several aliens sued Radovan Karadzic, leader of the self-proclaimed BosnianSerb republic of “Srpska” (which exercised actual control, and claimed lawful authority, over
parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina).49 The plaintiffs, Croat-Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina
(formerly Yugoslavia) alleged they were victims of various atrocities committed by BosnianSerb military forces during the Bosnian civil war.50 Plaintiffs alleged that Karadzic directed the
military forces while acting in an official capacity as either head of the unrecognized state of
Srpska or as collaborator acting in concert with the recognized Serbian Republic of the former
Yugoslavia.51 The plaintiffs asserted several causes of action under both the ATCA and the

47

See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769) (“Offenses
against [the law of nations are] principally incident to whole states or nations.”) quoted in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2756 (2004).
48
Kadic, 70 F. 3d at 240 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 795 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)). The Ninth Circuit fully adopted the Second Circuit’s
exceptions for ATCA liability without regard to state action in its infamous Unocal decision.
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F. 3d 932, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
49
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37.
50
Id. at 237.
51
Id.
13
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TVPA, namely: genocide, rape, forced prostitution and impregnation, torture, assault and battery,
sex and ethnic inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death.52
With regard to its first holding creating the genocide exception, the Kadic court examined
two issues: first, “whether some violations of the law of nations may be remedied when
committed by those not acting under the authority of a state,”53 and second, “whether genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity are among the violations that do not require state
action.”54 In carving out its exception, the court discussed a “substantial body of law” in order to
hold that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting
under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals.”55
The court offered as its first example of the application of the law of nations against
private individuals the prohibition against piracy.56 The Supreme Court had gone so far as to call
pirates the “‘hostis humani generis’ (an enemy of all mankind) . . . because they acted ‘without .
. . any pretense of public authority.’”57 Later examples include the prohibition against the slave
trade and the prohibition against certain war crimes.58
Having established piracy, slave trade and war crimes as international law violations not
requiring state action, the court then stated that the Executive Branch had itself recognized the
ATCA as an available remedy against private individuals. First, Attorney General Bradford in
52

Id.
Id. at 236.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 239.
56
Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S.
184, 196-97 (1820)).
57
Id. (quoting The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 232 (1844)). The court also refers the reader
to 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (Univ. of Chi. ed.
1979).
58
Id. (citing M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 193 (1992); Jourdan Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights
Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51 (1992)).
53
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1795 approved of an ATCA remedy in reference to the plunder of British property by American
citizens off the coast of Sierra Leone.59 Second, the current administration, in a Statement of
Interest addressed to the Kadic court, asserted that private persons could be liable under the
ATCA for “acts of genocide, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian
law.”60
Next, the court pointed out that the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States declares that “‘[i]ndividuals may be held liable for offenses against
international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide.’”61 The Restatement carefully
distinguishes between international law violations that are actionable when committed by a
state62 and those that are of “universal concern.”63 The former include genocide, slavery or slave
trade, the murder or disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, and a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.64 The latter
include violations a state may punish “without regard to territoriality or the nationality of the
offenders.”65 Violations of “universal concern” include piracy, genocide, war crimes, slave
trade, hijacking of aircraft, and “perhaps certain acts of terrorism . . . .”66 The court stated that
the inclusion of piracy and aircraft hijacking demonstrates that “offenses of ‘universal concern’
59

Id. (citing Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795)).
Id. at 239-40.
61
Id. at 240 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. pt.II, intro.
note (1986)).
62
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 702 (1986)).
63
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 404 (1986)).
64
Id. at 240 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 702
(1986)).
65
Id. at 240 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(1)(a),
(2) (1986)).
66
Id. at 240 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 404
(1986)).
60
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include those capable of being committed by non-state actors”67 and that international law
authorizes states to apply civil remedies, such as the ATCA.68
The court then proceeded to determine whether genocide, war crimes and torture and
summary execution, as alleged by the plaintiffs, are causes of action that may be asserted against
a private individual under the ATCA. In support of its holding that genocide is such a violation,
the court cited the United Nations as authority. First, the United Nations declared that “genocide
is a crime under international law . . . whether the perpetrators are ‘private individuals, public
officials or statesman.’”69 The United Nations also affirmed Article 6 of the Agreement and
Charter Establishing the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal where those who persecuted on
political, racial or religious grounds may be punished regardless of whether they acted as
individuals or members of organizations.70 The United Nation’s Convention on Genocide,
ratified by the United States in 1989, gives a specific definition of genocide and applies liability
for violation of its prohibition against constitutionally responsible leaders, public officials, and
private individuals.71
It is at this point that the court did something “truly remarkable.”72 First, it indicated that
the Genocide Convention Implementation Act criminalizes genocide regardless of whether the

67

Id. at 240.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 404 cmt. b
(1986)). The court also highlighted the fact that the only two cases invoking the ATCA prior to
Filartiga asserted liability against private actors. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp 857 (D. Md.
1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607).
69
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (quoting G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188-89, U.N. Doc A/64/Add.1 (1946)).
70
Id. (citing G.A. Res. 95(I), at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946); In re Extradition of
Demjanjuk, 612 F.Supp. 544, 555 n.11 (N.D. Ohio 1985)).
71
Id. (citing Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide arts. II, IV,
Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for the United States Feb. 23, 1989)).
72
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2775 (Scalia, J., concurring).
68

16

MNC Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
offender is a state-actor (i.e., “whoever commits genocide”)73 if it is committed in the United
States or by an American national.74 It then reiterated the law’s assertion that it not be
“‘construed as creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in
any proceeding.’”75 Nevertheless, the court held that the ATCA permitted a private remedy for
acts of genocide for three reasons. First, it found “the legislative decision not to create a new
private remedy does not imply that a private remedy is not already available under the
[ATCA].”76 Second, there was nothing in the law itself or its legislative history suggesting a
congressional intent to repeal the ATCA as it applied to genocide. And third, the court found the
two laws were not repugnant to each other. Thus, the court held that a cause of action already
existed under law, i.e., the ATCA, pre-dating the Genocide Convention Implementation Act, and
so the court did not run afoul of Congress’ intention that no new federal causes of action in civil
proceedings be created.77
Although, how the court may use the implementation law to expand or confirm a
preexisting cause of action under the ATCA as applicable to private individuals when that law
explicitly denies that it creates any new federal private causes of action is unclear. That is, if
genocide existed as a cause of action under the ATCA prior to the implementation law, but was
not considered actionable against non-state-actors, then the federal implementation law cannot be
used to expand liability to such actors as it would then be creating a new federal private right of
action contrary to Congress’ intent. Indeed, the implementation act’s admonition against

73

Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242 (quoting Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1091(a) (1988)).
74
Id. (citing Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a), (d)
(1988)).
75
Id. (quoting Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1092 (1988)).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 242 n.6.
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creating a private right of action can be construed as forbidding any expansion of existing
notions of liability for acts of genocide. Thus, the Kadic court is mistaken to have relied upon
the implementation act to justify a claim for genocide against non-state-actors, and must fall
back on the Convention on Genocide itself and the other United Nations sources it has cited.
The court next held that war crimes (i.e., murder, rape, torture and arbitrary detention of
civilians committed during hostilities) are actionable against private actors under the ATCA.
The court cited the Supreme Court as support for the assertion that such atrocities are recognized
as violations under international law, which imposes an affirmative duty upon commanders to
prevent them.78 The court then found that under common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
the parties to a conflict who are obligated to abide the convention’s requirements of the law of
war include “insurgent military groups.”79 However, the court fails to explain how it arrived at
such a conclusion whereby “roving hordes of insurgents”, i.e., anti-state-actors, are to be
obligated by a treaty which they neither signed nor ratified. That is, unless the court means to
imply that such prohibitions against war crimes as existing under the conventions have ripened
into international customary law according to which both state and non-state actors may be held
liable. However, the court simply stated that the “liability of private individuals for committing
war crimes has been recognized since World War I and was confirmed at Nuremberg after World
War II.”80 It cited only two articles to support this contention.81

78

Id. at 242 (citing In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1946)).
Id. at 243.
80
Id.
81
See Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and International Law, 450 INT’L
CONCILIATION 304 (April 1949); Jordan Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crimes
Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, in 4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 447 (R. Falk ed., 1976), cited with approval in Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. See
also Ann B. Ching, Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in Light of the Celebici
Decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
79
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At this point, what has been implicit in the court’s rationale now becomes explicit. The
court is unabashedly blending the concepts on international criminal culpability with domestic
private law tort liability. Consequently, private individuals who could be found guilty of
international crimes may additionally have private actions asserted against them in tort. The
elimination of the “just following orders” defense under international criminal law has resulted
in the elimination of the State-action requirement for genocide and war crimes allegations under
the ATCA. Yet, perhaps this result is understandable for two basic reasons. First, the ATCA
itself refers only to the “law of nations” which was generally accepted as applicable on to States,
yet the Act fails to distinguish between public law and private law. Second, the Supreme Court
in the Smith case explicitly referred to “the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law”
as a source by which to ascertain the law of nations;82 and criminal law is, after all, a subdivision
of public law.
As for torture and summary execution, the court declined to extend its Filartiga holding
to include unofficial acts of private individuals. It maintained that international law proscribed

COM. REG. 167, 167 (1999) (According to the doctrine of superior-subordinate liability “a
subordinate cannot escape liability merely because he or she was following the orders of a
superior.”); Id. at n.4 (“The ‘just following orders’ defense was made infamous in the United
States by the actions of U.S. Army Lieutenant Calley at My Lai during the Vietnam War.”);
United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973); James McHenry, Justice for Foca: The
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia’s Prosecution of Rape and Enslavement as
Crimes Against Humanity, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 183, 211-12 (2002) (“. . . Article 7 of
the ICTY statute explicitly considers individual criminal responsibility for acts committed in
relation to the conflict in Yugoslavia; therefore, the ICTY itself has personal jurisdiction to
prosecute anyone who may be criminally liable for violations of international law in this setting.
Furthermore, Article 7(4) expressly prohibits a "just following orders" defense, although it does
allow such a claim as a mitigating factor. Moreover, the ICTY's ability to prosecute individuals
reflects a growing trend in international law to expand the legal personality of individuals.
Finally, the defense of "just following orders," even if it not prohibited by Article 7(4) of the
ICTY enabling statute, has been rejected soundly by international law since Nuremberg.”)
(emphasis added).
82
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820) (emphasis added).
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torture and summary execution only when committed by state officials or under color of law.
Thus, a non-state actor may be liable for such acts only when perpetrated in the course of
genocide or war crimes.83
Having determined that non-state actors could be held liable for genocide or war crimes
in claims brought under the ATCA (i.e., the genocide exception), the court then explored the
meaning of the state-action requirement for international law violations in order to determine
Karadzic’s culpability for torture and summary execution. First, the court found that the stateaction requirement is satisfied even if the state on whose behalf the act is done is not recognized
by other states. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States does not
require a state to be formally recognized by other states as long as it otherwise satisfies the four
familiar requirements for statehood (i.e., defined territory, permanent population, under the
control of its own government, and engagement or capacity to engage, in formal relations with
other states).84 In Ford v. Surget, Justice Clifford stressed that regardless of the wrongfulness of
a state’s origin, it “‘must be considered a de facto government if it was in the full and actual
exercise of sovereignty over a territory and people large enough for a nation.”85 Furthermore,
the court asserted that federal courts “have regularly given effect to the ‘state’ action of
unrecognized states. The court cited several cases involving secessionist Civil War era states as
well as East Germany.86 Additionally, customary international human rights law does not

83

Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243-44.
Id. at 244 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 201, 202
cmt. b (1986); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 720 (1868)).
85
Id. (quoting Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 620 (1878) (Clifford, J., concurring)).
86
Id. at 244-45 (citing United States v. Insurance Cos., 89 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1875); Thorington v.
Smith, 75 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1868); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686, 699 (2d
Cir. 1970)).
84
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distinguish between recognized and unrecognized states in its application.87 In dictum, the court
appeared to lower the bar for the traditional Blackstonian requirement of state-action in
international law where it stated that “it is likely that the state action concept, where applicable
for some violations like ‘official’ torture, requires merely the semblance of official authority.”88
Second, the court found that a claim that an individual acted “in concert” with a state is
sufficient to allege that that individual “acted under color of law” for the purposes of satisfying
the state-action requirement.89 In so doing, the court declared, “[t]he ‘color of law’
jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in
official action for purposes of jurisdiction under the [ATCA].”90 From whence this “relevant
guide” came or why it is appropriate for it to be grafted onto international law claims is not
explained. The court cited only one case, from a district court in California, for support.91 The
court then cited Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. for the rule that “[a] private individual acts under
color of law within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with
significant state aid.”92
As for the TVPA, the court simply affirmed what the act itself and its legislative history
state expressly, namely, that state action is required by way of “actual or apparent authority, or

87

Id. at 245 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 207, 702
(1986)).
88
Id. (emphasis added).
89
C.f. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(a) (“For harm resulting to a third person from the
tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (a) does a tortious act in concert
with the other or pursuant to a common design with him . . .”) (emphasis added).
90
Id. (emphasis added).
91
Id. (citing Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
92
Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
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color of law, of any foreign nation.”93 Congress instructed the courts to construe such terms
according to principles of agency law and § 1983 jurisprudence, respectively.94
As a result of Kadic, a private individual or non-state actor may be held liable under the
ATCA for genocide, war crimes and violations committed in the course of genocide or war
crimes without proof of state-action. In order to allege state-action, § 1983 jurisprudence is to be
applied as a “relevant guide” and a defendant may be liable even if acting “under the color” of a
de facto or unrecognized state.
C. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
It took 215 years, but with Sosa, the Supreme Court made its first substantial decision on
the meaning and scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act.95 In it, the Court finally announced a
standard for determining what causes of action defendants might be held liable and upon which
corporate defendants might hopefully rely. Though long awaited, the decision is not altogether
unexpected, for with its standard, the Court in effect toed the line by which most courts already
adhered,96 namely the “specific, universal and obligatory” standard.97 What was surprising,
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Id. (quoting Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a) (2005).
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-367(I), at 5 (1991)).
95
See generally Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989)
(holding that no exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act applied to give the district court
jurisdiction over the Argentine Republic in an action brought by Liberian corporations under the
ATCA for destruction of oil tanker on high seas in violation of international law); Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, n.17 (1972) (pointing out that the ATCA is among a
series of special federal statutes that grant jurisdiction in areas that would otherwise fall under
the general federal question statute); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
(finding that the ATCA indicates a desire by the First Congress to give matters of international
significance to the jurisdiction of federal courts rather than the states); O’Reilly de Camara v.
Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 52 (1907) (suggesting a cause of action for expropriation of property might
be cognizable under a predecessor to section 1350, but the question of ATCA jurisdiction
disposed of “on the merits”).
96
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765 (“The position we take today has been assumed by some federal
courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala . . . .”).
94

22

MNC Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
however, was that the Court failed to assert a standard for determining how private actors might
be liable for a violation requiring state action. The Court not only left the “door ajar” for new
causes of action, but for further district court finagling of liability standards by which they could
keep MNCs in federal court.
In Sosa, the Court heard the case of an alien suing a private individual under the ATCA
for allegedly violating an international law prohibiting arbitrary arrest. The plaintiff, Humberto
Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican citizen, had previously been acquitted in federal court for the
murder of a DEA agent in Mexico. Alvarez now alleged that in order to get him into a U.S.
court to be tried for the murder the DEA had enlisted several Mexican civilians, including Jose
Sosa, to seize him and bring him across the border from Mexico to the United States so that
federal agents could arrest him. In reversing the Ninth Circuit and granting the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the Court decided that Alvarez’ single illegal detention of less than one day
did not violate any norm of international law. Thus, Alvarez did not have a cause of action for a
tort “in violation of the law of nations” under the ATCA.
In arriving at its decision, the Court announced three important limitations on the scope
of the ATCA. First, the ATCA is only jurisdictional. Second, that jurisdiction includes ability to
enforce a small number of international norms recognized as part of the common law at the time
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See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring);
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370
(E.D. La. 1997). Since the Sosa decision, several courts have retained the “specific, universal
and obligatory” standard. See, e.g., Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1320-28 (N.D. Cal.
2004); Doe v. Saravia 348 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1114 (E.D. Cal. 2004). C.f. Mujica v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 381 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1177 n.12 (2005) (“While the Supreme Court did not
expressly disavow the ‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ standard, [this] court chooses to
closely follow the approach provided by Sosa.”).
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the statute was adopted. Third, the Court announced a standard for determining what new causes
of action federal courts might properly recognize as within the Act’s jurisdiction.
The Court gave three reasons for holding that the ATCA is only a grant of subject matter
jurisdiction. The original version of the ATCA passed by the first Congress as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that the federal district courts “shall also have cognizance . . . of
all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”98 The Sosa Court interpreted “cognizance” as a grant of jurisdiction only, “not
power to mold substantive law.”99 Furthermore, it found that the purposeful placement of the
ATCA in § 9 of a statute exclusively concerned with federal-court jurisdiction supports this.
Third, it recognized that the difference between jurisdiction and cause of action would have been
fully appreciated by the drafters of the Judiciary Act.
Next, the Court held that the ATCA was not stillborn, but was intended to permit the
federal courts to hear a narrow set of federal common law actions that were derived from the law
of nations. Subject to a nonexistent congressional record, the Court delved into an analysis of
the historical circumstances surrounding the drafting of the ATCA, including a brief précis of the
Marbois Incident of 1784. The Court concluded that three offenses against the law of nations
addressed by the criminal law of England were “probably on minds of the men who drafted the
[ATCA] with its reference to tort.”100 These three offenses are: violation of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.
Lastly, the Court announced a restrained standard for determining what new causes of
action might be asserted by aliens in federal court as a violation of the law of nations. The
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Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 79.
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755.
100
Id. at 2756.
99

24

MNC Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
standard is intended to limit federal courts’ discretion in considering claims under the presentday law of nations as elements of the common law. Thus, it requires that any such new claims,
first, “rest on a norm of international character”, second, that norm must be “accepted by the
civilized world,”101 and third, that norm must be “defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the [three] 18th-century paradigms.”102 The Court added two factors for courts to
consider: the “practical consequences” of making the new cause of action available in federal
court,103 and “whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual.”104
Footnote twenty is the only time the Court made explicit mention of corporations as
possible ATCA defendants in its opinion. Unfortunately, the Court failed to approve of any
particular standard of liability already being utilized by the federal courts in assessing MNC
liability under the ATCA (e.g., “color of law” liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or aiding &
abetting liability). It does, however, seem to suggest that whatever liability standard is
appropriate for a given norm should be derived from international law rather than domestic law.
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Does the Court mean by “civilized” the Christian world? See also The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 694, 700 (1900) (“The word ‘comity’ was apparently used by Lord Stowell as
synonymous with courtesy or goodwill. But the period of a hundred years which has since
elapsed is amply sufficient to have enabled what originally may have rested in custom or comity,
courtesy or concession, to grow, by the general assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of
international law…. And the Empire of Japan (the last state admitted into the rank of civilized
nations), by an ordinance promulgated at the beginning of its war with China in August, 1894,
established prize courts….) (emphasis added); Statute of the International Court of Justice, art.
38 (“[T]he ICJ shall apply . . . general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. . . .”)
(emphasis added).
102
As an example of the specificity it requires, the Court cites United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.
153, 163-180, n.a (1820) for an illustration of how the law of nations defined piracy.
103
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766.
104
Id. at 2766 n.20 (emphasis added). See also id. at 2782 (“The norm must extend liability to
the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue.”) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Disappointingly, the Court appeared in the footnote to implicitly affirm the cognoscibility of
ATCA claims against MNC defendants.
Toward the end of the opinion the Court for a second time mentions private actor
liability. In rejecting Alvarez’ allegation of arbitrary detention, defined as an officially
sanctioned action, the Court appeared to reprove Alvarez in that all of his attempts to
demonstrate that his claim is one of well defined and accepted international customary law
“assumes that Alvarez could establish that Sosa [a Mexican civilian] was acting on behalf of a
government when he made the arrest, for otherwise he would need a rule broader still [i.e., one
not requiring the act to be officially sanctioned].”105 This terse statement suggests that the Court
approves of holding private actors liable under rules requiring state action. Although, again, it
fails to indicate under what standard a private actor might be found to be “acting on behalf of” a
state. The Court also seems to have implicitly endorsed Kadic’s “genocide exception” to the
state-action requirement under the ATCA by saying Sosa may need a “broader rule.” That
broader rule is one in which a private actor may be held liable for violating the norm absent
“officially sanctioned action.”
Ultimately, “the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping and thus open to a
narrow class of international norms today.”106 The Court noted that its position, i.e., authorizing
the judicial power to recognize new claims under the law of nations as part of the federal
common law, had already been assumed by and was consistent with several federal courts since
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Id. at 2768.
Id. at 2764. But see id. at 2774 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the door represents the
common law that was closed by Erie). Erie, however, only proscribed the application of the
general law, or the federal common law, by the district courts sitting in diversity actions. ATCA
claims raise the hybrid action of federal question and diversity. And in any case, the district
court in an ATCA action would not have to choose between state law and general law, as in Erie,
but must rather apply the general law in its most general form, that is, international law.
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Filartiga.107 Furthermore, this position had never met with Congressional disagreement.108 As a
result, after Sosa, federal courts continue to enjoy the wide discretion they had since Filartiga,
this time with the Court’s blessing. Unfortunately, corporate defendants are left as unsure as
before as to what new causes of actions they may be susceptible to and by what standards their
liability might be judged. The trend begun by Filartiga and expanded by Kadic has been
endorsed by Sosa, and it is sure to continue, possibly for another 200 years.

III. MNC Liability under the ATCA & TVPA.
The Alien Tort Claims Act contains two grants of jurisdiction for foreign tort claimants.
In 1991, Congress codified and expanded upon Filartiga with the adoption of the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA) and added it as a note to section 1350.109 Plaintiffs often bring their
claims under both the ATCA and the TVPA. Where the ATCA is vague, the TVPA is explicit.
Where the ATCA is expansive, the TVPA is narrow. Each has its particular history, rules and
limitations. Therefore, when examining the standards by which MNC liability is to be judged,
each must dealt with separately, at least to begin with.
A. The ATCA: State-Action Implied & the Genocide Exception.
The Alien Tort Claims Act provides in its entirety that “the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
107

Id. at 2765. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 104 n.10 (2d Cir. 2000)
(“Filartiga remains the leading case interpreting the ATCA.”). The Court’s alignment with the
Filartiga school should come as no surprise considering that in 1996 it denied certiorari for
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (1995), a case which rested upon and implicitly confirmed the
principles established by Filartiga.
108
Indeed, Congress approved of the view of Filartiga by enacting the Torture Victim Protection
Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991).
109
See H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (noting that
the purposes of TVPA are to codify Filartiga, to alleviate separation of powers concerns, and to
expand the remedy to include U.S. citizens).
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law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”110 A plaintiff must satisfy three conditions in
order to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATCA: (1) plaintiff must be an
alien (2) suing for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of nations or U.S. treaty.111 “[I]t is
not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to plead merely a colorable violation of the law of
nations.”112 It should be apparent after reading Sosa that the first and often highest hurdle for
anyone hoping to sue a MNC under the ATCA is alleging a violation of the law of nations that a
federal court will recognize.
However, the question of whether MNCs are subject to liability at all under the ATCA
seems to have been answered in 1997 by the landmark case of Doe v. Unocal Corp.113 For the
first time a federal district court held that a corporation and its executive officers could be held
liable under the ATCA for violations of international human rights in a foreign country.114 The
case is significant for two reasons. First, “it allowed the plaintiffs to seek damages from a U.S.
corporation, even if it was only one of several named responsible parties for a violation of the
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See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (1980); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238
(1995).
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Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238. See also Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165-69 (5th
Cir. 1999) (dismissing claims of individual human rights violations under the ATCA on the
ground that complaint failed to provide “adequate factual specificity”); Dwares v. City of New
York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We have, of course, repeatedly held that in order to state a
claim of conspiracy under section 1983 the complaint must contain more than mere conclusory
allegations. … And while a plaintiff should not plead mere evidence, he should make an effort to
provide some ‘details of time and place and the alleged effect of the conspiracy.’").
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Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in pt., rev’d in pt., 395 F.3d
932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403
F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). See generally Earthrights International, Resource Center: Doe v.
Unocal, http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
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See infra app. I.
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ATCA.”115 Second, the court “recognized that corporations are viable defendants for plaintiffs
claiming an ATCA violation.”116
The case settled in the spring of 2005, ostensibly as a precondition for a merger between
Unocal and ChevronTexaco. Shortly afterward, the legal team for the Burmese plaintiffs made
the following statement:
[T]his is a historic victory for human rights and for the corporate
accountability movement. Corporations can no longer fool
themselves into thinking they can get away with human rights
violations. This case will reverberate in corporate boardrooms
around the world and will have a deterrent effect on the worst
forms of corporate behavior.117
The possibility of the case having a deterrent effect has yet to be determined. Yet there is
no doubt that the outcome of the first Unocal judgment emboldened victims of human rights
violations to seek redress from MNCs in American courts. Since 1997, the number of ATCA
suits against MNCs has increased significantly, though none have as yet gone to trial.118 That a
corporation may be held legally responsible under the ATCA seems to have become a forgone
conclusion for most judges.119
Thus, whether it is an individual or an MNC being sued, the ATCA requires that stateaction be alleged (except in certain circumstances).120 This requirement is implied by basic
principles of international law and federal case law.
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Armin Rosencranz & David Louk, Doe v. Unocal: Holding Corporations Liable for Human
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Earthrights International, Press Release: Historic Advance for Universal Human Rights:
Unocal to Compensate Burmese Villagers,
http://www.earthrights.org/news/press_unocal_settle.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
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See infra app. I.
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The same cannot be said for corporate liability under the TVPA.
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See generally Ved P. Nanda & David K. Pansius, The State Action Requirement, 1
LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 9:12 (2005).
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It is a general principle that international law applies only to nations.121 Customary
international law itself, upon which ATCA suits are partly based, is derived from the consistent
practice of states acting out of a sense of legal obligation.122 Furthermore, the sources and
evidence of international law, such as treaties or United Nations declarations, speak in terms of
the responsibilities of states, not individuals.123 For example, Article Thirty-Eight of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice states that the court, in deciding in accordance with
international law, must apply: “international conventions . . . establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states, international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law, [and] the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations . . . .”124
Therefore, violations of international law require state action.
This principle has been adopted in the U.S. and applied to the ATCA through federal case
law.125 In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,126 Judge Edwards considered whether non-state
actors might be held to the same “behavioral norms” as states. In his concurrence, he noted:
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See MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (5th ed., 2004) (“National law is
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body politic – the state or similar entity. . . . International law, at least as originally conceived, is
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Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. 1.
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See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”); United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
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In the 19th century, the view emerged that states alone were
subjects of international law, and they alone were able to assert
rights and be held to duties devolved from the law of nations. . . .
In this century . . . writers have argued that both the rights and
duties of international law should be applied to private parties. . . .
However, their discussions are more prescriptive than descriptive;
they recognize shifts in firmly entrenched doctrine but are unable
to define a clear new consensus.127
After a thorough review of the historical grounds for liability under the law of nations,
Edwards concluded that purely private individuals, i.e., those neither associated with nor acting
under the color of any state, may not be held liable for violations of international law under the
ATCA.128 However, Edwards did recognize a “handful” of historical exceptions permitting
private liability for violations of international law, including piracy and slave trading.129
Presciently, he added “I have little doubt that the trend in international law is toward a more
expansive allocation of rights and obligations to entities other than states . . . .”130
Judge Rymer of the Ninth Circuit echoed Edwards’ general state-action requirement in In
re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation.131 There he stated, “Only
individuals who have acted under official authority or under color of such authority may violate

Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is also well settled that the law of nations is
part of federal common law.”).
126
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
127
Id. at 794.
128
The District of Columbia Circuit Court adopted Judge Edwards’ finding in Sanchez-Espinoza
v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985), concluding that customary international law
does not reach private, non-state actions.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 795. See also Dr. P.K. Menon, The International Personality of Individuals in
International Law: A Broadening of the Traditional Doctrine, 1 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 151
(1992).
131
In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
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international law.”132 This principle has been adopted by several other courts and
commentators.133
This simple requirement was complicated somewhat after Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. There, the Court held that the ATCA could not be used to obtain a forum
in the district courts for an action against a sovereign nation or its agents acting in the scope of
their official duties because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976134 was the sole basis
for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts.135 That decision, occurring as it did
between Filartiga and Kadic, perhaps explains the recent popularity of suing MNCs. MNCs end
up as default defendants for conduct largely committed by the victim’s government. Not only
can those governments not be sued under the ATCA, but there are few international forums for
victims of human rights abuses that permit suits by individuals against a state. The International
Court of Justice only concerns parties that are states.136 And it is not generally possible or
practical for the victims of atrocities to seek redress in national courts for the acts of their
government or of entities in which their government has a favorable interest.137 Furthermore, the
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Id. at 501-02. See also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The
[Kadic court] [] went on to state that although “acts of rape, torture, and summary execution,”
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395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal
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states themselves are often protected by sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine or the
political question doctrine. Thus, victims go after those that they can, the MNCs.138
The historical principle that state-action is required in order to attribute liability to an
entity for an alleged violation of international law has been embraced by the federal courts. Yet,
the matter of what standard should be applied in order to determine whether this requirement has
been satisfied is a work in progress among the circuits. As a result, MNCs may be held liable
under the ATCA in several ways depending upon the extent of their operations, their relationship
with the host country, and the nature of the alleged violations.
B. The TVPA: State-Action Expressed.
The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) provides a private cause of action only for
official torture and extrajudicial killing. The law states:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation –
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable
for damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an
action for wrongful death.139
The TVPA requires the plaintiff to exhaust “adequate and available remedies” in the
place the conduct occurred,140 imposes a ten-year statute of limitations,141 and, interestingly,

judiciary in Burma and any suit against defendants would have been and would still be futile and
would result in serious reprisals. There is a pervasive atmosphere of terror and repression
throughout the country.’”).
138
The creation of the International Criminal Court may help relieve some of this pressure on the
ATCA and MNCs.
139
28 U.S.C. §1350 note § 2(a) (2005).
140
Id. at § 2(b).
141
Id. at § 2(c).
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permits suits by U.S. citizens tortured abroad.142 Section Three provides definitions for “torture”
and “extrajudicial killing.”143
However, the act does not provide a definition for the term “individual.” Where under
the ATCA, courts have generally presumed MNCs may be held liable, this is not so under the
TVPA. The absence of a statutory definition for “individual” has created some difference of
opinion among the district courts as to whether corporations may be held liable under the TVPA.
Recently, in Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,144 Judge Rea of the Central District
of California held that corporations are not “individuals” liable under the statue.145 In Mujica,
Occidental, an American company based in Los Angeles, operated an oil production facility and
pipeline near the plaintiffs’ village of Santo Domingo as part of a joint venture with the
Colombian government. The plaintiffs, Colombian civilians, alleged that Occidental provided
funding and practical support for a private security company and the Colombian Air Force
(CAF) to engage in military operations aimed at protecting the corporation’s interests from leftwing insurgents. During one such military operation, the private security company and the CAF
allegedly dropped a cluster bomb on Santo Domingo, killing seventeen civilians. The plaintiffs
brought claims under the ATCA, the TVPA and California state law.
Judge Rea based his holding solely upon a reading of the plain language of the TVPA
done in a manner that would avoid an “‘absurd result.’”146 The statute describes one liable as an
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“individual” who subjects another “individual” to torture or extrajudicial killing. Rea did “not
believe it would be possible for corporations to be tortured or killed” or “to feel pain and
suffering.”147 Rea grounded his construction on the principle that “terms should be construed
consistently throughout the statute.”148 Thus, he found the plaintiff’s argument based on Clinton
v. City of New York to be unpersuasive. There the Court had held the term “individuals” to be
synonymous with “persons” under the Line Item Veto Act, observing that “the term ‘person’
‘often has broader meaning in the law.’”149 Rea also noted he could not find any “pertinent
legislative authority” in congressional committee reports. Ultimately, however, Rea granted
Occidental’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss pursuant to the political question doctrine.
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran provides another bit of helpful analysis in support of the
rule that corporations are not “individuals,” and thus not liable, under the TVPA.150 There, the
court also applied a plain-language interpretation of the statute. Tom Beanal, and Indonesian
citizen, brought several claims under the ATCA and TVPA against an American corporation
headquartered in New Orleans that owned a subsidiary in Indonesia which operated open pit
copper, silver and gold mines. As part of its 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Freeport asserted that
the TVPA did not apply to corporations. District Judge Duval began by analyzing the plain
meaning of the term “individual” and noting that the term does not typically include a
corporation. The court cited Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary
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as defining “individual” to mean a “single human being” and “single person” respectively.
Duval relied on an Eleventh Circuit case in support of this finding.151
Where Judge Rea avoided any “pertinent legislative history”, Judge Duval found that
declining to apply the TVPA to corporations was “not at odds with congressional intent.”152
First, there was no legislative history as to whether corporations may be held liable. Second, the
House Report states, “Only ‘individuals’, not foreign states, can be sued under the bill.”153
Third, the Senate Report confirmed that the statute used the term “individuals” in order to make
it clear that foreign states may not be sued, only “individuals.”154 Duval concluded from this that
Congress purposely chose to use the specific term “individual,” and although Congress may not
have intended to exclude corporations from liability, the TVPA clearly applies only to
“individuals,” which Duval understands to mean natural persons and not corporations.
Despite the seemingly unimpeachable reasoning of Judges Rea and Duval, at least two
other courts have come to the opposite conclusion. In Sinaltrainal v. The Coca-Cola Co., the
Southern District of Florida held that liability under the TVPA extended to corporations
essentially because there was no evidence in the legislative history of a congressional intent to
exempt corporations.155 The court provided three reasons. First, the Senate Report explained
that the purpose of the statute was to “permit suits ‘against persons who ordered, abetted, or
assisted in torture.’”156 Second, the Senate Report did not mention any corporate exemptions and
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courts have held corporations liable for suits under the ATCA.157 Third, and unlike Judge Rea in
Mujica, the court found the holding in Clinton v. City of New York to be persuasive. Thus,
because other areas of law generally view corporations as persons, if Congress had intended to
exempt corporations from the TVPA it would have done so explicitly. The district court for the
Northern District of Alabama adopted this reasoning for its holding in Lacarno v. Drummond
Co., Inc.158
There are two significant differences between the TVPA and the ATCA. First, the stateaction requirement is found expressly in the TVPA while it is only implicit in the ATCA as a
hand-me-down from traditional notions of international law. Second, the TVPA pertains to two
clearly defined causes of action for torture and extra-judicial killing and so finds sources for
standards of application in domestic law. The ATCA, on the other hand, applies to an
amorphous and expanding panoply of international law violations and so it is not limited to
domestic sources, but may find the standards for application in international sources.
Nonetheless, the TVPA’s legislative history perhaps warrants a broader cast of liability than the
Mujica interpretation of “individuals” would indicate. In its report, the Senate Judiciary
Committee explained that the TVPA would permit suits “against persons who ordered, abetted,
or assisted in torture.”159 In the Wiwa case, the Southern District of New York found that the
language and legislative history of the Act supports liability for aiders and abettors.160
Consequently, the ATCA and the TVPA share a common outer limit for MNC liability at “under
color of law” and aider & abettor status for, regarding the latter Act, torture and extra-judicial
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killing, and regarding the former Act, an amorphous and expanding catalog of horrors.161 Of
course, the ATCA, pursuant to Kadic’s genocide exception, eschews the state-action/color of law
standard completely for genocide, war crimes and international law violations committed in the
course of genocide and war crimes.

IV. Aiding & Abetting Standard for MNC-Accomplice Liability and
The Latent Jurisprudence of Unocal.
While the federal courts have consistently embraced the state-action requirement in
applying the ATCA and TVPA, they have employed several standards in order to determine
whether a private corporation may be held liable for a State’s human rights violations. Two
important methods of holding MNCs liable are as direct actors via § 1983 “color of law”
jurisprudence, or as third-party accomplices according aiding and abetting standards. Because
MNC’s are more likely to engage with foreign states as third-party violators, the aiding and
abetting standard will be dealt with more thoroughly. What is not clear, however, as is evident
from the Unocal case, is against which aiding and abetting standard MNC behavior is to be
gauged.
As for § 1983 “color of law” liability, one theory as to its use as a source of ATCA
liability relies on the notion that an ATCA claim, while based on an international law violation,
161

The ATCA and TVPA also share a common statute of limitations. Although the ATCA does
not expressly mention one, several courts have borrowed the TVPA’s ten year period of
limitations for ATCA actions. See Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F. 3d 932, n.13 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en
banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005),
Papa v. United States, 281 F. 3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2002); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell,
2002 WL 319887, at 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor
Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 462 (D.N.J. 1999); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1195-96
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). But see Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 191-93 (D. Mass. 1995)
(applying Massachusetts’ statute of limitations to ATCA claims without considering applicability
of the TVPA ten-year limitations period).
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is actually a domestic claim. “[T]the ATCA does not adopt wholesale all principles of
international law. Rather, it creates a domestic cause of action for violations of international
law.”162 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit, using the language of Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren, has
stated “It is unnecessary that international law provide a specific right to sue. International law
'does not require any particular reaction to violations of law. . . . Whether and how the United
States wished to react to such violations are domestic questions.'”163 The ATCA is a creature of
domestic law. “[A]bsent an international norm of what constitutes state action for the particular
offense, domestic law may provide a reasonable source of guidance.”164 As a result, many courts
have looked to domestic standards of liability by analogy in order to find that MNCs may be
liable for certain violations under the ATCA.
Kadic was perhaps the first court to utilize the “color of law” jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 as “a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in official action for purposes of
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act.”165 The court held that “a private individual acts under
color of law within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with
significant state aid.”166 The Kadic court held that the Serb villagers had sufficiently alleged the
Radovan Karadzic had acted under color of law by claiming that he “acted in concert with the
former Yugoslavia . . . .”167

162

Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) cited with approval in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation,
25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
164
Nanda & Pansius, supra note 118 (emphasis added).
165
Kadic, 70 F. 3d at 245. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal.
1987).
166
Id. (emphasis added). See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
167
Id. (emphasis added).
163

39

MNC Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
In Sosa, the Supreme Court implicitly affirmed the Second Circuit precedents since
Filartiga and Kadic pertaining “color of law” liability and holding private corporations liable for
jus cogens violations of international law under the “genocide exception” absent state action.
The Court also affirmed the existence of aiding and abetting liability under the ATCA by quoting
with approval Attorney General Bradford’s 1795 opinion that any person “committing, aiding, or
abetting” attacks on the British would be “liable for punishment under the law of nations.”168
However, the Court failed to articulate what standard should be applied in evaluating ancillary
MNC liability.
Prior to Sosa, courts sought standards for the aiding and abetting liability of MNCs from
four directions: civil, criminal, domestic and international. The Unocal case, although dismissed
pursuant to a settlement in 2005 before it could be reheard by the Ninth Circuit en banc, provides
two useful examples of jurisprudence a federal court might utilize to hold an MNC liable under
the ATCA, regardless of state action. The two judge majority employed an international
criminal standard borrowed largely from United Nation’s ad hoc tribunals. The concurrence,
alternatively, concluded that an ATCA action was one of the narrow fields appropriate for the
application of federal common law because such actions often implicated United States relations
with foreign states. Furthermore, the concurrence found that the federal common law remedy
was necessary in order to promote the Congressional policy underlying the ATCA. The result of
Unocal is to articulate at least three varieties of aiding and abetting liability possible under the
ATCA: international criminal law, federal common law, or international criminal law as
expressed, integrated and filtered by federal common law.
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In the Unocal case, villagers from Myanmar brought an action under the ATCA against
the American oil company Unocal Corp. alleging that it had aided and abetted the Myanmar
military in the commission of human rights violations in order to facilitate the construction of a
gas pipeline.169 More specifically, the villagers alleged they were subjected to forced labor,
murder, rape, and torture. The two-judge majority in Unocal looked to international criminal
aiding and abetting standards in holding that the villagers had sufficiently pled violations of the
law of nations under the ATCA.
First, applying the “specific, universal, and obligatory” international norm standard,170
the majority held that torture, murder, rape, and forced labor were all jus cogens violations and
thus violations of the law of nations.171 Second, the court held that since “forced labor is a
modern variant of slavery” it is among those “handful of crimes” that do not require state action
to give rise to ATCA liability.172 Furthermore, because the acts of rape, torture and murder were
committed in furtherance of forced labor, a la Kadic’s genocide exception, state action is not
required for such acts either.173
With regard to the forced labor claim, the court held that a reasonable factfinder could
find Unocal liable under the ATCA for aiding and abetting the Myanmar Military.174 The aiding

169

See Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F. 3d 932, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d
978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
170
C.f. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2765 (2004).
171
Unocal, 395 F. 3d at 944-45.
172
Id. at 946-47. In so holding, the court relied on the following authorities: U.S. Constitution,
Thirteenth Amendment (“[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the
United States.”); United State v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F. 3d. 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir.1995) (slavery
constitutes a jus cogens violation); World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp.
2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (implicitly including forced labor in the definition of ‘slavery’ for
purposes of the ATCA); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (forced
labor violates the law of nations).
173
Id. at 954.
174
Id. at 947.
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and abetting standard the court applied was that of “knowing practical assistance or
encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”175 In so doing, the
court chose to apply international law rather than the law of Myanmar or California.
To begin with, the court found that the District Court had erred in applying the “active
participation” standard.176 The District Court had borrowed the standard from the Nuremberg
Military Tribunal cases involving German industrialists and the Nazi forced labor programs,
where it had been applied in order to overcome the “necessity defense.”177 Unocal had not
invoked that defense. Nonetheless, the court agreed that international law as developed by
international criminal tribunals contained the applicable substantive law.178
The court admitted that it is an open choice of law question as to whether international
law, the law of the state where the events occurred, or the law of the forum should be applied.179
The court cited several domestic sources so as to hold that international law was the applicable
law. First, it found that in a case such as this where only jus cogens violations were alleged,
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Id. (emphasis added). While not addressing alternative theories of liability, the court
mentioned in dictum that joint venture, agency, negligence, and recklessness may be viable
theories on the Unocal facts, and perhaps more appropriate in other ATCA cases. Id. at 947
n.20.
176
Id. at 947.
177
“Necessity is a defense when it is shown that the act charged was done to avoid an evil both
serious and irreparable; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and that the remedy
was not disproportionate to the evil.” Id. at 948 n.21 (quoting United States v. Krupp, 9 Trials of
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10,
1436 (1950) quoting 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law 177 (12th ed. 1932)).
178
Id. at 948.
179
Id. (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F. 3d 88, 105 n.12). See Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 180-83 (D. Mass. 1995) (international law provides substantive law
for ATCA cases); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 777, 781-82 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (forum’s tort law provides substantive causes of action); In re
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 978 F. 2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) (tort law of state where
underlying events occurred); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) (district
court must perform traditional choice of law analysis to determine whether international law,
forum law, or lex loci delicti should provide substantive law).
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international law was preferable because, by definition, any state law is either identical to jus
cogens norms, or it is invalid.180 Second, looking to foreign or state law for the cause of action
“mutes the grave international law aspect of the [ATCA] tort, reducing it to no more (or less)
than a garden variety municipal tort.”181 The court noted that the more crucial tension was
between international law and Myanmar’s law (where the underlying events occurred).182 It
implied this was because the law of nations had been absorbed into the federal common law and
the federal common law was most likely to be the applicable forum law where the action arose
under a federal statute. Third, the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the ATCA creates a
cause of action as well as confer jurisdiction.183 Fourth, the factors of § 6(2) of the Restatement
(2d) of Conflict of Laws point to international law: (a) the needs of the international system
would be better served by applying international rather than national law; (b) the relevant
policies of the forum cannot be ascertained; (d), (f), and (g) the standard adopted dates back to
the Nuremberg trials and resembles that in the Restatement (2d) of Torts; (e) the basic policy
underlying the field of tort law is to provide remedies for violations of international law.184
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Id.
Id. (citing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995)).
182
Id. at 949 n.23.
183
See Papa v. United States, 281 F. 3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002); Marcos II, 25 F. 3d 1467,
1474-75 (9th Cir. 1994). C.f. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2761 (2004)
(“[A]lthough the [ATCA] is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, the
reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the statute was intended to have
practical effect the moment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been
enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the
time.”). See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our
law . . .”).
184
Unocal, 395 F. 3d at 949.
181
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Upon different facts, however, the analysis may result in the application of forum state’s law,
federal common law, or the lex loci delicti.185
Having found international law to be the applicable substantive law, the Unocal majority
next held that standard of aiding and abetting liability under international criminal law was
appropriate. First, the distinction between criminal and tort law is not necessarily important:
“[h]uman rights law has largely been developed in the context of criminal prosecutions . . . what
is a crime in one jurisdiction is often a tort in another jurisdiction . . . and the standard for aiding
and abetting in international criminal law is similar to the standard for aiding and abetting in
domestic tort law . . .”186 Second, the trend among District Courts is to look to international
criminal tribunals for human rights law standards under the ATCA.187 Consequently, the Unocal
court found that recent decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were “especially
helpful for ascertaining the current standard for aiding and abetting under international law as it
pertains to the ACTA.”188
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Id. at 949 n.25.
Id. at 949.
187
See Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(applying the statute and a decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (noting that the
statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and their recent opinions are particularly relevant for determining
international law norms as they apply to the ATCA).
188
Unocal, 395 F. 3d at 949-50. See also Filartiga, 630 F. 2d at 880 (“The law of nations may be
ascertained by consulting . . . judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.”). The
Unocal court denied that it was declaring the Furundzija aiding and abetting standard to be the
controlling standard and so it was not bound by every aspect of the standard. Rather, the
tribunal’s decision was merely one of the sources of international law, but not the source of
international law. Unocal, 395 F. 3d at 951 n.28. But see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination.”).
186
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The Unocal court relied principally on the ICTY case of Prosecutor v. Furundzija and
the ICTR case of Prosecutor v. Musema for the actus reus and mens rea of aiding and abetting
under international law.189 The court noted that the Furundzija Tribunal had based its standard
on an “exhaustive analysis” of international case law and international instruments. The former
consisted of decisions by American, British and German courts hearing cases of Nazi war
crimes. The latter consisted of the United Nation’s Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.190 The court
observed that it “is hard to argue with the Furundzija Tribunal’s reliance on these sources” and
the “Tribunal’s reliance on these sources again seems beyond reproach.”191
With regard to the actus reus, Furundzija held “it requires practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime.”192 Such “assistance” need not be a conditio sine qua non for the acts of the principal, but
must merely make a significant difference.193 The MNC’s acts have a “substantial effect” where
“the criminal act most probably would not have occurred in that same way without someone
acting in the role that the accomplice [MNC] in fact assumed.”194 The Musema Tribunal
similarly defined the standard as “all acts of assistance in the form of either physical or moral
support that substantially contribute to the commission of the crime.”195
With regard to the mens rea for aiding and abetting, Furundzija required “actual or
constructive (i.e., reasonable) knowledge that the accomplice’s actions will assist the perpetrator
189

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1 T (Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999);
Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T (Jan. 27, 2000).
190
Unocal, 395 F. 3d at 950-51 n.26, n.27 (citing Ferundzija at ¶¶ 192-234, 227).
191
Id.
192
Id. at 950 (quoting Furundzija at ¶ 235).
193
Id. (citing Furundzija at ¶¶ 209, 233).
194
Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY-94-1, ¶ 688 (May 7, 1997)).
195
Id. (citing Musema at ¶ 126).
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in the commission of the crime.”196 The MNC need neither share the mens rea of the principal,
nor know the precise crime that the principal intends to commit.197 If the MNC is “aware that
one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact
committed, [the MNC] has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and is guilty as an
aider and abettor.”198 Similarly, the Musema Tribunal required that the accomplice “[know] of
the assistance he was providing in the commission of the principal offence.”199 It sufficed that
he “knew or had reason to know” of the principal’s intent to commit the crime, though he did not
have to share the same intent.200
Finally, the court noted that the “assistance” and “encouragement” aspects of the
Furundzija aiding and abetting standard are similar to that of U.S. tort law. According to
Section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: “For harm resulting to a third person from
the tortuous conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the other’s
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement [sic] to
the other . . .”201
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Courts grant of summary judgment for
Unocal and held that the MNC could be liable for the acts of forced labor, murder and rape, but
not the acts of torture. However, the court left the question of liability for providing “moral
support” for another day. Because there was sufficient evidence that Unocal gave assistance and
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Id. (citing Furundzija at ¶ 245).
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 951 (citing Musema at ¶ 180).
200
Id.
201
Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1979)). See also id. at 951 n.28 (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt.d (stating the “encouragement to act operates as a
moral support”)).
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encouragement to the Myanmar Military, it was not necessary to decide whether moral support
alone would have been enough for liability.202
Tort
Claims

Actus Reus

Mens Rea

“practical assistance or encouragement which
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of
the crime”

“actual or constructive (i.e., reasonable)
knowledge that the accomplice’s actions will
assist the perpetrator in the commission of the
crime”

Forced Labor Practical Assistance &
Encouragement:
- “hiring the Myanmar Military (MM)
to provide security and build
infrastructure along the pipeline route
in exchange for money or food”203
- “using photos, surveys, and maps in
daily meetings to show the [MM]
where to provide security and build
infrastructure”204
Substantial Effect:
- “forced labor . . . ‘most probably
would not have occurred in the same
way’ without someone hiring the
[MM] to provide security, and without
someone showing them where to do
it”205
- Unocal Rep. Robinson: “our
assertion that [MM] has not expanded
and amplified its usual methods
around the pipeline on our behalf may
not withstand much scrutiny”206

- “the evidence does suggest that
Unocal knew that forced labor was
being utilized and that the Joint
Venturers benefited from the
practice”208
- “Unocal knew or should reasonably
have known that its conduct –
including the payments and the
instructions where to provide security
and build infrastructure – would assist
or encourage [MM] to subject
Plaintiffs to forced labor.”209
- Unocal V.P. Lipman: even before
Unocal invested in the Project, Unocal
was aware that “the option of having
the [MM] provide protection for the
pipeline construction . . . would
[entail] [sic] that they might proceed
in the manner that would be out of our
control and not be in a manner that we
would like to see them proceed,” i.e.,
“going to excess.”210

- Unocal Pres. Imle: “if forced labor
goes hand and glove with the military
yes there will be more forced labor”207
202

Id.
Id. at 952, 952 n.29.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 952-53 (quoting Tadic at ¶ 688)
206
Id. at 953.
207
Id.
208
Id. (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part by Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F. 3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002)).
209
Id.
203
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Murder &
Rape (in
furtherance of
forced labor)

Torture (in
furtherance of
forced labor)

Practical Assistance &
Encouragement:
- see Forced Labor

- “Unocal knew or should reasonably
have know that its conduct – including
the payments and the instructions
where to provide security and build
infrastructure – would assist or
encourage the [MM] to subject
Plaintiffs to these acts of violence.”211

Substantial Effect:
- see Forced Labor
- Unocal Consultant Haseman’s
comment to Unocal: “the most
common [human rights violations]
- “[B]ecause Unocal knew that acts of
[sic] are forced relocation without
violence would probably be
compensation of families from land
committed, it became liable as an aider
near/along the pipeline route; forced
and abettor when such acts of violence
labor to work on infrastructure
– specifically, murder and rape – were
projects supporting the pipeline . . .
in fact committed.”212
[and] execution by the army of those
opposing such actions [sic].”
“The record does not, however, contain sufficient evidence to establish a claim
of torture (other than by means of rape) involving Plaintiffs. Although a
number of witnesses described acts of extreme physical abuse that might give
rise to a claim of torture, the allegations all involved victims other than
Plaintiffs. As this is not a class action, such allegations cannot serve to
establish the Plaintiffs’ claims of torture here.”213

The concurring Judge Reinhardt concluded instead that common law theories of thirdparty liability ought to be applied rather than borrowing a doctrine from the ad hoc War Crimes
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.214 He found that the question of Unocal’s third-party tort
liability “should be resolved by applying general federal common law tort principles, such as
agency, joint venture, or reckless disregard.”215
In order to prevail against Unocal for the policy of forced labor committed by the
Myanmar Military (MM), the plaintiffs must prove that the private entity may be held legally
responsible for MM’s human rights violations. According to Reinhardt, this raises two issues of
210

Id. at 954 n.32.
Id. at 956.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 955.
214
Doe I, 395 F. 3d at 977-78 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
215
Id. at 963.
211
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first impression: (1) “Under what circumstances may a private entity doing business abroad be
held accountable in federal court for international law violations committed by the host
government in connection with the business activities of the private entity [?]”;216 (2) “[T]o what
body of law do we look in order to determine the answer?”217
Regarding the body of law issue, Reinhardt ultimately concluded that federal common
law was applicable based on Supreme Court precedents and the Restatement (Second)’s choiceof-law analysis. Reinhardt first noted that the face of the ATCA provides that the “law of
nations” applies to determine whether a violation has occurred, but it is silent as to what law
applies to ancillary issues, i.e. third-party liability.218 Instead of looking to international law,
however, as the majority did, Reinhardt believed instead that the court was required to look to
the federal common law to resolve “ancillary legal issues that arise in ATCA cases” for the
following reasons.219
The Erie case limited the applicability of federal common law to narrow circumstances
(e.g., when authorized by Congress).220 However, in Texas Industries v. Radcliff Material, the
Supreme Court held that even without congressional authority, “the federal courts should apply
federal common law ‘in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of
the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States
or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.’”221 Reinhardt reasoned that because

216

Id. at 965.
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
See generally Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
221
Doe I, 395 F. 3d at 965 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (quoting Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)) (emphasis added). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (“It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have
rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.”)
217
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ATCA claims always involve a violation of international law, they consequently very often
implicate our relations with foreign nations. He concluded that there are “unique federal
interests involved in [ATCA] cases that support the creation of a uniform body of federal
common law….”222
The second reason Reinhardt gave for the applicability of federal common law is because
in the case of the ATCA the federal courts “are required to resolve issues ancillary to a cause of
action created by Congress.”223 The Supreme Court held in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.
that where Congress has created the cause of action, the courts should apply federal common law
“to fill the interstices of federal legislation.”224 Thus, “federal common law is applicable where
courts are required to implement the policies underlying a federal statute by fashioning
appropriate remedies.”225 Here, it is necessary to apply federal common law in order to fashion
an appropriate remedy with respect to the indirect involvement of third parties in the commission
of a federal tort.226
Reinhardt did not think that situations such that arise in this case are so rare that the
courts must immediately surrender themselves to international law. “The fact that some of the
acts at issue here may have taken place abroad does not militate in favor of applying
international law; transnational matters are litigated in federal court, using federal legal

222

Doe I, 395 F. 3d at 965 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
Id. at 965-66.
224
Id. at 966 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979)).
225
Id.
226
Id. The Eleventh Circuit is in agreement with Reinhardt’s position. In Abebe-Jira v. Negewo,
72 F. 3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996), it observed that the purpose of the ATCA is “to establish a
federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to five effect to
violation of customary international law.” Doe I, 395 F. 3d at 966 n.4 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
223

50

MNC Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
standards, more and more frequently as the pace of globalization grows ever more rapid.”227
Reinhardt stated that the courts should not look to international law principles unless mandated
by a statute or the existence of exceptional circumstances.228 Examples given for appropriate use
of international law include interpreting the substantive provisions of the ATCA, the TVPA and
certain provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act.229
Furthermore, Reinhardt found it necessary to distinguish between substituting
international law for federal common law and merely using international law as a part of federal
common law. In the case of the latter, using federal common law does not mean a court must
ignore a relevant principle of international law. But in the case of the former, the court would
lose the benefits of the “vast experience embodied in the federal common law” and use instead
“an undeveloped principle of international law promulgated by a recently-constituted ad hoc
international tribunal.”230
Finally, Reinhardt concluded that federal common law was required pursuant to the
choice-of-law inquiry of the Restatement (Second) section 6.231 First, “ease in determination and
application of the law” is furthered by a well-developed body of federal common law rather than
a criminal law standard recently decided in an ad hoc international tribunal.232 Second,
“certainty, predictability and uniformity of result” are more likely where there are available
precedents and the stability of the law is not threatened by possible future decisions of un-formed
international tribunal created to deal with a unique regional conflict.233 Third, the “justified
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Id.
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id. at 967.
231
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6 (1974).
232
Doe I, 395 F. 3d at 967 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
233
Id.
228
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expectations” of the parties are more likely to be met by applying the generally well-known
federal common law principles of joint liability, agency, and reckless disregard.234 Fourth,
because the policy of the ATCA is to “establish a federal forum where courts may fashion
domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law,”235
the “relevant policy of the forum” is to apply federal common law remedies.236 Finally, “the
basic polic[y] underlying” the field of ATCA law is to “provide an appropriate tort remedy for
certain international law violations.”237 Thus, the application of a tort standard of liability
furthers the policy of using tort law to redress international violations while applying an
international criminal law standard does not further that objective.238 Contrary to the majority,
Reinhardt would not have the choice of law determination depend on the facts of each particular
case.239
Having concluded that federal common law was applicable, Reinhardt then discounted
the possibility of applying the majority’s standard via the common law. First, the ICTY standard
adopted by the majority has not achieved sufficient international acceptance to constitute
customary international law so that it may become part of the common law.240 And second, the
ICTY’s standard is “far too uncertain and inchoate a rule for us to adopt without further
elaboration as to its scope by international jurists.”241 For example, the “[m]embers of a future
ad hoc tribunal elected by representatives of all of the nations that may then belong to the United
Nations General Assembly might well define the term quite differently than does the majority
234

Id.
Id. at 967-68.
236
Id. at 968.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 969.
240
Id. (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980)).
241
Id. at 969-70.
235

52

MNC Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
here.”242 Reinhardt concluded his concurrence by then describing and applying the three
applicable federal common law standards of liability that had been alleged by the plaintiffs: joint
venture liability (i.e., Unocal and the Myanmar Military were joint venturers), agency liability
(i.e., the Myanmar Military was acting as Unocal’s agent), and reckless disregard (i.e., Unocal
recklessly disregarded the known risk that by hiring the MM, it would likely engage in human
rights abuses to perform the duties Unocal desired it to fulfill in the pipeline construction).
Although Reinhardt would have looked to federal common law for the appropriate standards of
third-party liability, he nonetheless arrived at the same conclusion that Unocal could be found
liable with the evidence as alleged.
The U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York aligned itself with the
position of the Unocal majority in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy.243 In
Talisman several residents of Sudan brought a class action under the ATCA alleging that the
Canadian energy company had aided and abetted the Sudanese government in a policy of ethnic
cleansing in order facilitate oil exploration activities. The court dismissed Talisman’s motion to
dismiss by finding that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that Talisman had aided and abetted
with Sudan to commit jus cogens violations. Like the Unocal majority, the New York court
reached almost instinctively to international sources instead of looking first to U.S. concepts of
aiding and abetting. This result seems to be mostly a function of the substance of the allegations,
i.e., jus cogens, of genocide, war crimes and torture. The court stated:
The ATCA provides a cause of action in tort for breaches of
international law. In order to determine whether a cause of action
exists under the ATCA, courts must look to international law.
Thus, whether or not aiding and abetting and complicity are
242

Id. at 970.
244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Talisman decision also presents an excellent
review of much of the Second Circuit’s ATCA jurisprudence.
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recognized with respect to charges of genocide, enslavement, war
crimes, and the like is a question that must be answered by
consulting international law.244
The court then proceeded to cite several international criminal law sources of aiding and
abetting liability, many of which had also been utilized by the Unocal majority, including: the
Statute of the International Military Tribunal, the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, the
Genocide Convention, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Prosecutor v. Musema, and Prosecutor v.
Tadic.245
The Supreme Court’s Sosa decision has served to reconfigure the trend articulated in the
Unocal and Talisman courts’s aiding and abetting standard. Even the U.S. District Court of the
Central District of California recognized as much.246 The Sosa Court effectively signaled that a
standard more aligned with Judge Reinhardt’s concurrence would fair significantly better than
the majority’s if challenged before the high court.
The Furundzija aiding and abetting standard applied by the Unocal majority (i.e.,
knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of
the crime) would not pass must under the test for new causes of action for tortuous articulated by
the Sosa court. According to Sosa, new forms of liability must be “based on the present-day law
of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms we have
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Id. at 320.
Id. at 322-24. See also Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1356 (N.D.Ga. 2002)
(adopting the aiding and abetting standard of the ICTY and the Furundzija case) declined to
follow by Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005).
246
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1173 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (The Ninth
Circuit’s decision in [Unocal] has arguably been altered by the Supreme Court’s more recent
decision in Sosa.”).
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recognized.”247 The Court assessed Alvarez’s claim for arbitrary detention in light of The
Paquete Habana sources of international law:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these,
to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor,
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are
resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their
authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is.248
First, the Sosa Court declined to accept two significant international sources as evidence
that a cause of action existed for Alvarez’s arbitrary detention claim under the law of nations for
ATCA purposes. The Court found the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights did not create a formal rule of international
law and had “little utility” under its standard. The former was simply a declaration of principles
and the latter was not self-executing and so did not create enforceable obligations in U.S. federal
courts.249
Second, the Court found that the rule Alvarez sought was far too broad to find sanction as
a binding rule of customary international law. Alvarez relied heavily on a survey of national
constitutions and case from the International Court of Justice. He failed to provide any evidence
of foreign laws substantiating the type of arbitrary detention he alleged was prohibited under
customary international law. Also, the rule Alvarez sought was in direct tension with existing
U.S. law. Thus, Alvarez failed to produce specific evidence of the widespread use of the rule he
asserted.
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Likewise, the Unocal majority has failed to supply the requisite evidence of customary
international law to support its application of a standard articulated by an ad hoc war crimes
tribunal. Judge Reinhardt’s pre-Sosa concurrence presciently described the difficulties with the
majority’s standard. First, “courts should not substitute [sic] international law principles for
established federal common law or other domestic law principles … unless a statute mandates
that substitution, or other exceptional circumstances exist.”250 Second, the Furundzija rule is too
“uncertain and inchoate” to be considered a binding rule of customary international law. And
third, the rule adopted was articulated by an ad hoc international court created by an international
organization of member states. Customary international law, however, is the result of the
consistent practice of states themselves, not of an international body. As Reinhardt pointed out,
such a standard is susceptible to redefinition by different members of a future ad hoc tribunal
elected by the different representatives of the states that may then belong to the United Nations
General Assembly at that time.251 Thus, the Unocal standard fails to meet the Sosa test for the
law of nations under the ATCA, i.e., specificity, well-worn usage, and widespread international
acceptance.
V. Conclusion.
The Alien Tort Claims Act has undergone a renaissance in the last ten years. Foreign
human rights victims have been compelled to obtain compensation and recognition through the
ATCA due to the convergence of several factors, most notably the significant globalization and
expansion of MNC activities in the last decade as well as the inability and unwillingness of
States and supra-national organizations to close the “legal lacuna” in which such corporations
operate. The Sosa Court managed to articulate a standard by which future ATCA litigants and
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judges might craft their remedies. While it is unlikely the decision will stem the tide of litigation
against MNCs for human rights violations, it has at least reigned in the more ridiculous attempts
at creating broad standards of ex post facto liability. The best way to protect local stakeholders
involved in overseas MNC investment activities is to create workable and predictable parameters
in which for them to operate. Without predictability and specificity in the rules, whether based
on the law of nations or a legal Lohengrin, it is unlikely that any person will be satisfied with the
way corporations interact with foreign governments. The Sosa Court affirmed the solid
embankment the Second Circuit’s ATCA jurisprudence had built, and with little disruption, it
managed to establish a breakwater to maintain that jurisprudence’s place on the U.S. shore
against the unremitting surge of international law.

57

